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Session 9
EMERGING POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner
Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program
The George Washington University Law School
David J. Berteau
Director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington D.C.
I.

SHIFTING LEADERSHIP AND PRIORITIES

Last year, we celebrated the recent confirmation of Daniel Gordon as the new Administrator of
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), bemoaned the Congressional delay of Martha Johnson’s confirmation as the administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA), and could only
speculate whether (and from where) some discernable direction might arise in terms of the administration’s acquisition reform agenda. See also Steven L. Schooner, Federal Contracting and Acquisition: Progress, Challenges, and the Road Ahead, Chapter in Framing a Public Management Research
Agenda (IBM Business of Government, 2010), available at, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542830. As
we approach 2011, a different landscape awaits.
This year, the most dramatic source of activity emanated from the Defense Department, primarily
through USD(AT&L) Ashton Carter’s Efficiency and Productivity Initiative. Aviation Week recently reported
that: “Ashton Carter plans to resign his tenured position at Harvard University and continue his work as
procurement czar at the Pentagon ‘as long as the president and the secretary of defense want me to keep
doing what I’m doing[.]’ … [That’s significant because most observers agree that] the Pentagon’s efficiency
initiative — a drive to conduct business leaner and slow the growth of the defense budget — is unlikely
to succeed without the teamwork of Carter and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.” More on this below.
Meanwhile, OFPP remained busy – impressively so, given its tiny staff. In addition to a host of
challenges (demonstrating acquisition savings, rebalancing the federal/contractor workforce, and reimagining the organizational conflict of interest regime), for the first time in decades, the administration appears committed to investing in the acquisition workforce. See, e.g., http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/procurement and http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_index_other/topics. And a
late-breaking topic to watch appears to be the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) initiative to
reinvent the government’s approach to the acquisition and management of its information technology (IT).
We remain unconvinced – and we attempt not to be distracted by – the dramatic rhetoric promising
savings just waiting to be found in the acquisition system; nor do we believe that the system is capable
of generating credible data demonstrating or validating the promised results. See, e.g., Peter Orszag,
Cutting Waste and Saving Money Through Contracting Reform (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/10/07/07/Cutting-Waste-and-Saving-Money-Through-Contracting-Reform.
“In March 2009, the President directed agencies to save $40 billion annually by [FY] 2011 through contracting and to reduce the use of high-risk contracts. Last December, OMB reported on agency plans to
save $19 billion in FY 2010, and agencies are on track to meet that savings goal as well as the larger one
for 2011.” (Emphasis added.) See also, July 15, 2010 Testimony of OFPP Administrator Daniel I. Gordon
(“There is much work ahead, but early results show that we are on track in our efforts to achieve savings and reduce contracting risk.”), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
legislative/testimony/ofpp/Gordon_testimony_715.pdf; OMB Reports on Contracting Reform Successes,
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52 GC ¶ 237. Rather, we continue to believe that real savings – as opposed
to insignificant, symbolic gestures – will occur when the government curbs
its appetite for spending. Reducing requirements – buying less goods and
services – will generate savings. And only time will tell whether Congress
and the agencies are serious about doing less, jettisoning programs, and
eliminating existing mandates.
II.

SPENDING: PLATEAU OR DOWNWARD TREND? AN END
TO THE POST-MILLENIUM Procurement Spending
BINGE?

A. OK, It’s Still A Lot of Money. Throughout the past decade, we
continued to be surprised by the increased volume and rate of federal
procurement spending. Using adjusted figures (yes, between FPDS and
USASpending.gov, history is consistently being re-written), it appears
that the annual increases in federal procurement – from 2001 through
2008 – were never less than three times the rate of inflation. The experts
swore that the growth would taper, and, in 2009, the growth rate did slow
and, apparently, finally, stall. Yet, in retrospect, the dire warnings that
the current spending binge was a blip – and that procurement spending
would promptly retract – were unfounded.
Now there seems to be greater consensus and empirical evidence that
the procurement spending growth cycle finally has run its course. But the
news is not all bad for contractors in that – at least for now – the plateau
represents the high-end of a robust and sustained growth curve.
Federal Procurement Spending 2001–2010*
Fiscal
Year

Procurement
Spending (in Billions
of Dollars)

Percentage Increase
or (Decrease) From
Previous Year

Percentage Increase or
(Decrease) in Consumer
Price Index (CPI)

2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001

$534.5*
$540.4
$541.3
$475.0
$429.8
$391.2
$345.8
$317.7
$263.4
$223.1

(~1)
(~0)
13.9
10.5
9.8
13.1
8.8
20.6
18.0

0.1*
(0.4)
3.8
2.8
3.2
3.4
2.7
2.3
1.6

*FY 2010 reflects preliminary reporting.

See www.USASpending.gov. Annual increases in the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) were extracted from the annual
Detailed Report Tables, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpi_dr.htm#2010.
B. Big Business, Major Players. Looking behind the data, the concentration of spending amongst the largest contracting agencies and government contractors remains significant. For example, for fiscal year 2009:
•
© 2011 Thomson Reuters

The Defense Department accounted for sixty-nine percent of the
total procurement dollars awarded.
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•

The seven largest procuring agencies (DoD, Energy, HHS, GSA,
NASA, VA, and DHS) accounted for ninety percent of the total
dollars awarded.

•

The 100 largest federal contractors received more than $294 billion in contracts or more than half of the total dollars awarded.

•

Conversely, the 521,036 contract actions they received, as a
group, accounted for less than ten percent of the total actions.

•

The top five federal contractors (Lockheed Martin, Boeing,
Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Raytheon) received
more than $112 billion in contracts or more than twenty-one
percent of the total dollars awarded.

•

Thirty-four firms received contract awards of more than $2 billion.

•

Sixty-nine contractors were awarded, individually, more than $1
billion in contracts.

C. Data Quality: Incremental Improvement. Due in large part
to the introduction of USASpending.gov, the procurement spending
data to which the public enjoys access continues to improve, but it
remains far from perfect. Consider, for example, that the government
still lacks a means for quantifying money actually spent on contracts,
as opposed to the amount of dollars awarded. While FPDS is far more
user-friendly (for registered users) and visually pleasing (to casual users) in its current iteration, it seems less inclined to concatenate and
publish obvious, significant, macro-level information. For instance, a
casual user might conclude that, for whatever reason, FPDS apparently has not run or published a Federal Procurement Report since
Fiscal Year 2007. Still, the greatest concerns lie with data input and
accuracy, and in that regard, much work remains. See, e.g., IG Faults
SBA Efforts to Improve FPDS Data Quality, 52 GC ¶ 99; DHS FPDSNG Data Incomplete, IG Finds, 52 GC ¶ 70.
D. Grants: The Next Frontier. For now, it remains our little secret
that, despite all of the attention focused upon government contracting,
over the last decade grant spending outpaced procurement spending by
more than sixteen percent. Indeed, grant spending exceeded procurement spending for eight of the last ten years. We can only hope that,
at some point, the oversight and regulatory community shifts its focus
from procurement to grants. If the government is serious about reducing its debts and its annual deficits, this seems unavoidable.
Federal Procurement and Grant Spending 2001–2010*
Fiscal
Year

Procurement Spending
(in Billions)

Grant Spending
(in Billions)

2010
2009
2008
2007

$534.5*
$540.4
$541.3
$475.0

$553.8*
$662.8
$418.1
$429.6
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2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001

$489.9
$441.6
$450.1
$493.7
$406.3
$330.8

$429.8
$391.2
$345.8
$317.7
$263.4
$223.1

*FY 2010 reflects preliminary reporting.

Total Federal Spending, www.USASpending.gov.
III. TIME FOR REAL CHANGE? THE DOD EFFICIENCY AND
PRODUCTIVITY INTIATIVE
From our perspective, the most important trends in 2010 emanate from
the Defense Department’s initiatives to squeeze savings, efficiencies, and
productivity out of the acquisition regime. The volume and pace of activity
have been high, and the scope and breadth of the initiatives are broad. See,
e.g., Ashton B. Carter, Memorandum for Acquisition Professionals, Better
Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in
Defense Spending (June 28, 2010) available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/
docs/USD(AT&L)_Memo_to_Acquisition_Professionals_June_28_2010.
pdf. Accompanying slides emphasize the following goals and approaches:
Obtain 2-3% net annual growth in warfighting capabilities
without identifying and eliminating commensurate budget
increase by unproductive or low-value-added overhead and
transfer savings to warfighting capabilities. Do more without
more.
...
Providing Incentives for Greater Efficiency in Industry, including

• Leveraging Real Competition
• Using Proper Contract Type for Development and
Procurement

•
•
•
•
•
•

Using Proper Contract Type for Services
Aligning Policy on Profit and Fee to Circumstance
Sharing the Benefits of Cash Flow
Targeting Non-Value-Added Costs
Involving Dynamic Small Business in Defense
Rewarding Excellent Suppliers

Adopting Government Practices that Encourage Efficiency

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
© 2011 Thomson Reuters

Adopting “Should-Cost” and “Will-Cost” Management
Strengthening the Acquisition Workforce
Improving Audits
Mandating Affordability as a Requirement
Stabilizing Production Rates
Eliminating Redundancy within Warfighter Portfolios
Establishing Senior Managers for Procurement of Services
Protecting the Technology Base
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The September 14 “Guidance Roadmap” refined the message, packaging twenty-three “principal actions to improve efficiency” into five “major
areas.” In many ways, particularly the use of italicized first person commentary interspersed throughout the text, the memorandum is unique.
See Ashton B. Carter, Memorandum for Acquisition Professionals, Better
Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (September 14, 2010), available at http://www.
acq.osd.mil/docs/USD_ATL_Guidance_Memo_September_14_2010_
FINAL.PDF. The Guidance Roadmap slide, http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/
USD_ATL_Guidance_Roadmap_September_14_2010.pdf, repackaged the
initiative under the following headings:
•
•
•
•
•

Target Affordability and Control Cost Growth
Incentivize Productivity & Innovation in Industry
Promote Real Competition
Improve Tradecraft in Services Acquisition
Reduce Non-Productive Processes and Bureaucracy

The guidance evolved into an implementation directive in early November. See Ashton B. Carter, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military
Departments (and) Directors of the Defense Agencies, Implementation
Directive for Better Buying Power—Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (November 3, 2010), available at http://
www.acq.osd.mil/docs/USD(AT&L)_Implementation_Directive_Better_
Buying_Power_110310.pdf. The implementation directive specifies dates
by which numerous tasks should be accomplished.
A. Sidebar: Major Systems. Last year, we suggested that it was
premature to conclude that major change has come to the major systems
acquisition regime despite the good intentions behind the Weapons Systems Acquisitions Reform Act (WSARA). That opinion is, to some extent,
fleshed out in the CSIS report, David J. Berteau, et al., Implementation
of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009: A Progress Report
(May 26, 2010), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/20100528_
WSARA_Progress_Report.pdf (“Any reliable assessment of whether this
objective has been achieved – i.e. the spirit of WSARA has been implemented – is going to take at least three to four years, given that cost and
schedule performance data are lagging indicators and are unlikely to
provide useful measures of effectiveness in the interim.”) The report cautions that the “emerging challenges for the acquisition system illustrate
that legislation[, regulation, and policy guidance] are certainly necessary,
yet they are far from sufficient to fix the defense acquisition system. Additional actions remain necessary to ensure better acquisition results in
the future, including a greater focus on the acquisition workforce as a
critical enabler and the backbone for successful acquisition outcomes.”
B. The Tanker Procurement: A Never-Ending Major System
Acquisition Case Study. We previously noted that the Obama administration would inherit one of the hottest potatoes imaginable—the future of
in-flight refueling for the Air Force. This incredibly important, high-profile
procurement has attracted (and, frankly, merited) extraordinary attention.
Last year, we joined the critics who do not understand why DoD or the
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Air Force refused to fund competitive prototypes and conduct a fly-off. We
went so far as to suggest that it was worth giving the two major players
funds to provide two prototypes each – one larger, one smaller. Then, the
Air Force could deploy the four tankers – for a year or even longer – and
let the end users weigh in. Ultimately, we would prefer an outcome where
both pricing and technical performance are based on experience and customer satisfaction rather than aspiration. In retrospect – particularly
to the extent that the contract still has not been awarded – there seems
little reason why the Air Force did not embrace this approach. This would
have been at least somewhat consistent with the Navy’s approach with
the littoral combat ship, where two contracts, each worth slightly more
than $3.52 billion, including options, call for Lockheed Martin and Austal USA each to assemble ten coastal warships. Christopher Drew, Navy
Awards Two Contracts to Build New Combat Ships, NY Times (December
30, 2010); Navy, LCS Design Instability Leaves Dual-Award Strategy on
Uncertain Course, GAO Finds, 52 GC ¶ 399. See also KC-X Procurement
Takes Another Turn, 52 GC ¶ 400 (contract award delayed until 2011;
proprietary information shared with competitors); GAO Denies Protest of
Air Force Rejection of Late Tanker Proposal, 52 GC ¶ 331.
IV. Acquisition Workforce: FINALLY, SOME ACTION
Last year, we were pleased that the acquisition workforce was increasingly, and seriously, addressed—both as a matter of policy and legislation.
(We apologize here for again attempting to summarize the familiar tale
that brought us to this point. The federal acquisition workforce declined
dramatically due to congressionally mandated personnel reductions in the
1990’s. We agree with those who assert that the government has not hired
an appropriate number of new acquisition professionals in any year since
the 1980’s. Accordingly, a disproportionate share of the existing workforce
is aging and, in large part, retirement-eligible; most of that workforce
was neither hired nor trained to primarily purchase services using flexible contractual vehicles. In addition, as discussed above, the volume of
purchasing exploded during the last decade. Thus, the government faces
a problem of enormous proportions.)
We continue to applaud both the message and the delivery of that
message by OFPP Administrator Gordon. Most importantly, he has acknowledged the existence of the problem. “The federal government has
not invested in the acquisition workforce enough to allow it to adequately
cope with the growth in contract spending or the increased complexity
of agencies’ missions …. This inattention to the workforce resulted in
increased use of high-risk contracting practices and insufficient focus on
contract management, as well as the especially troubling phenomenon of
agency dependence on contractors to support the acquisition function.”
At the same time, he has articulated a vision for remedying the situation.
“The Administration is committed to investing in the growth and development of the entire acquisition workforce …. The President’s Budget for FY
2011 requested $158 million to increase the capability and capacity of the
civilian agency acquisition workforce, and these funds will improve the
ability of agencies to hire, train, develop, and retain entry-level as well as
mid-level acquisition professionals …. OFPP established an annual acqui© 2011 Thomson Reuters
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sition workforce human capital reporting requirement for civilian agencies,
which should help institutionalize planning for our workforce and tie it
more closely to mission needs as well as to agencies’ budget processes ….
[OFPP is] working closely with … the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) to improve the hiring process for contracting professionals [and]
… conducting outreach to agencies to ensure that existing flexibilities for
hiring and retaining employees are used, whenever possible.” Testimony
of Daniel I. Gordon Before the Commission on Wartime Contracting (September 16, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/legislative/testimony/ofpp/2010-09-16_Gordon-OFPP.pdf.
OFPP Administrator Gordon also scores points for reminding Congress that the government’s problems will not end with a wave of hiring.
Training and development are equally critical, and impediments remain
to the government effectively addressing these challenges. See, e.g., Vernon J. Edwards, Foundational Training for New Government Contracting
Officials: An Outline and Suggested Reading, 24 N&CR ¶ 48 (“The surge
in employment of new contracting personnel and the availability of high
quality candidates … give federal managers a once-in-a-lifetime chance
to create a first-class corps of public administrators to run our $500-plusbillion-a-year acquisition business. But … federal managers must envision
those officials as being more than administrative/clerical drones sitting
in cubicles …. They must prepare the new hires … to see their jobs in a
larger context, so that they can fully understand the roles that they must
play.”). See also DOD Acquisition Workforce Training Needs Improvement,
52 GC ¶ 365; DOD Acquisition Workforce Would Benefit From Best-Value
Training, GAO Says, 52 GC ¶ 365.
Following Frank Anderson’s retirement in May, DoD announced that
Katrina McFarland will serve as the President of the Defense Acquisition
University (DAU). Vernon J. Edwards, Feature Comment: Choosing the
Defense Acquisition University’s New President, 52 GC ¶ 112 (envisioning
a dramatically different model). The changes in leadership at the Federal
Acquisition Institute (FAI) have been less transparent. We understand
that Donna Jenkins remains the Acting Director.
Agencies have their work cut out for them, however, in funding additional acquisition billets and investing in training and professional
development in an era of pay freezes and pressure to reduce government
spending. Hopefully, repeating the mantra “return on investment” will sustain the current trend. See generally DOD Civilian Workforce Plan Faces
Challenges, GAO Finds, 52 GC ¶ 327; EPA Contract and Grant Workforce
May be Insufficient, IG Reports, 52 GC ¶ 357; OFPP, DPAP Say Federal
Contracting Is Improving, 52 GC ¶ 239; OMB Acquisition Workforce Plan
Sets Framework, But Does Not Fulfill Mandate, GAO Finds, 52 GC ¶ 154;
State Can Better Track CO Training Certifications, IG Says, 52 GC ¶ 105.
V.

THE OTHER PENDULUM: Outsourcing-INSOURCING

Throughout our careers, pendulums, waves, and cycles have served
as popular metaphors for the “here we go again” aspects of acquisition
reform. An oversimplified version of the baby-boomer storyline might
begin in the mid-to-late 1980’s, an era of robust spending with a series of
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high-profile defense acquisition problems. (The Ill-Wind investigations and
prosecutions served as the poster child.) The predictable reaction was a
period of intense legislation and regulation and, of course, an increase in
sanctions. (Consider, for example, the 1986 qui tam amendments to the
False Claims Act and the Procurement Integrity Act.) Staffing of the acquisition functions – both operational and oversight – were at astounding
levels by today’s standards. By the early 1990’s, however, agency heads
and end users complained that the acquisition system was unresponsive
and sought a more business-like approach. The 1990’s procurement reforms (again, at a macro-level) sought to reduce regulation and increase
purchaser flexibility. (Think, e.g., in terms of the FAR Part 15 re-write
– oral presentations, oh my!!! – and the proliferation of multiple-award,
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts.) Alas, the new millennium brought a spate of bad news stories. (A short list might include the
Air Force Tanker Lease/Druyun/Boeing debacle, a bottomless grab-bag
of horror stories prompted by an understaffed acquisition workforce attempting to meet unrealistic expectations in an unforgiving environment
in Iraq, and any number of post-Katrina clean-up contracts.) A new era of
constraint and regulation is upon us, and Congress has begun to reinvest
in the acquisition workforce for the first time in two decades. Analogous
stories played out in prior generations.
Parallel to this saga, a new pendulum has begun to swing: outsourceinsource. In past years we have noted that the government’s bipartisan
outsourcing (or, at times, “competitive sourcing”) initiative had spanned
more than fifteen years (and two two-term administrations), yet, last year,
it seemed that insourcing was all the rage. The latest trend focused on
“rebalancing” the federal and contractor workforces as a key element of
overall acquisition reform. See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Policy Letter, Work
Reserved for Performance by Federal Government Employees (March 31,
April 19, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_index_work_performance; Ralph C. Nash, Contracting-Out Policy:
Guidance From The Office Of Federal Procurement Policy, 24 N&CR
¶ 23 (“The most interesting aspect of this guidance is the functions that
are missing from the illustrations in spite of the fact that many agencies
have had these functions performed by contractors.”) To the extent that
we have been consistently unpersuaded by much of the insourcing rhetoric and have fretted that much of the insourcing activity (particularly at
DoD) is quota-driven rather than results-oriented, we are slightly more
sanguine this year. See generally CWC Probes Inherently Governmental
Functions, PSC Oversight, 52 GC ¶ 219; Industry Suggests Changes to
Proposed Guidance on Inherently Governmental Functions, 52 GC ¶ 195; E.
Sanderson Hoe & Phillip Carter, Feature Comment: OFPP Issues Proposed
New Definition of ‘Inherently Governmental,’ 52 GC ¶ 139; OFPP Seeks
Comments on Inherently Governmental Functions Guidance, 52 GC ¶ 126;
Ralph C. Nash, Contractors That “Closely Support Inherently Governmental
Functions”: They’ve Grown Like Topsy, 24 N&CR ¶ 8 (“Trying to develop
a competent Government workforce to award and manage contractors
that closely support inherently governmental functions may be a sound
short-term goal but it is poor long-term strategy. It makes … more sense
to develop a competent Government workforce to perform those functions
that closely support inherently governmental functions.”).
© 2011 Thomson Reuters
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No matter how the pendulum swings, the government faces enormous
challenges managing its service contracts. See also Vernon J. Edwards,
Contracting for Services: Challenges For The Next Generation, 24 N&CR
¶ 59 (“Services confront acquisition personnel with many challenges with
which our experience in the acquisition of supplies has not prepared us
to cope …. It seems unlikely that in the current economic and political
climate the Government is going to significantly reduce its reliance on
contractor services in the near term. Thus, the problem must be managed.”); Vernon J. Edwards, “Tradecraft” in Services Acquisition: DoD’s
New Policies, 24 N&CR ¶ 55 (“While we think that the USD AT&L memo
proposes to do some good things, the road to better services acquisition
does not run through policy. While policy is necessary, it does not solve
problems. People solve problems—people with know-how and skill. The
DOD memo focuses on procedures, making only a passing, one-sentence
allusion to the need for a more competent workforce.”)
A. Understanding The Outsourced Industrial Base for Services.
Despite its increased significance to the government’s ability to function,
the government consistently appears to lack accurate insight into the
extent and nature of its reliance on the private sector. One of our recent
reports sheds light on this topic. Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group,
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Structure and Dynamics of
the U.S. Federal Professional Services Industrial Base 1995–2009, available at http://csis.org/files/publication/101112_fps_report_2010.pdf.
The report details, with extensive macro- and micro-level analysis, how
the government has grown into its permanent and growing reliance on
contracts for a wide range of professional and support services. Over the
fifteen-year period 1995–2009, the professional services industry expanded
at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.2 percent per year, from
$137 billion in 1995, to $280 billion in 2009. Professional, administrative,
and management services (PAMS) represented by far the largest segment
within the federal professional services industry, accounting for $93.6 billion worth of contracts in 2009, up from only $27.4 billion in 1995.
During the same period, indefinite delivery vehicles (IDVs) experienced a remarkable 13.3 percent CAGR and, since 2006, accounted for a
majority of all professional service contract dollars. From 2005 through
2009, multiple-award indefinite delivery contracts (IDCs or ID/IQ’s) have
become a favored form of IDVs; they now annually distribute $47.1 billion
of contract funding, compared with only $1.9 billion in 1995. Multipleaward IDC growth remained robust in the last five years, achieving a 16.8
percent CAGR for contract value and a 13.6 percent CAGR for number
of contract actions.
The report identifies sustained areas of concern in service contracting:
•
•
•
•
•

inadequate contract oversight,
difficulties with the formulation of requirements,
the usage of suitable contract vehicles,
workforce issues—for contract surveillance in particular,
lack of visibility and effective metrics for performance assessments,
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•

insufficient strategic leadership and independent management
reviews,

•

lack of risk assessments for contractors closely supporting inherently governmental functions, and

•

fragmented organizational structures supporting services contracting.

Unfortunately, important policy issues regarding the U.S. professional
services industrial base cannot be resolved due to lack of data. Specifically, as noted above, FPDS presents a substantial obstacle; it contains no
data on contract performance despite the fact that acquisition regulations
already mandate collection of contract performance data.
B. Another Nail In The “Personal Services Prohibition” Coffin? One intriguing, yet little-known trend we confronted this year is
that contractor employees are more frequently suing the Government,
alleging employment discrimination on the part of Government managers,
supervisors, or even coworkers. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner & Collin D.
Swan, Feature Comment: Suing The Government As A ‘Joint Employee’-Evolving Pathologies Of The Blended Workforce, 52 GC ¶ 341 (October
20, 2010). At some level, this should not surprise us, as the government’s
increased reliance on employee-augmentation contracts has blurred the
distinction between contractor employees and civil servants throughout
the government workspace. Across the government, it is increasingly common to find contractor personnel and civil servants working in the same
offices and, all too often, performing the same or similar functions. And
the federal courts’ and the EEOC’s willingness to define federal agencies as de facto employers of contractor employees seems to offer further
evidence that the prohibition on personal service contracts is—or should
now be deemed—a dead letter.
Moreover, our sense is that most Government managers and contracting professionals have not fully recognized their potential liability as
a so-called “joint employer” of contractor personnel. Many a frustrated
Government manager has favored outsourcing because it is easier for
managers to jettison individual contractor employees, for whatever reason,
than to terminate or reassign civil servants. Apparently, however, it seems
increasingly likely that a contractor employee’s denial of a preferred assignment or an employment opportunity today could spur a discrimination
claim against the agency.
VI.	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: A NEW APPROACH?
[D]espite spending more than $600 billion on [IT] over the
past decade, the Federal Government has achieved little of the
productivity improvements that private industry has realized
from IT. Too often, Federal IT projects run over budget, behind
schedule, or fail to deliver promised functionality. Many projects
use “grand design” approaches that aim to deliver functionality
every few years, rather than breaking projects into more
manageable chunks and demanding new functionality every few
quarters. In addition, the Federal Government too often relies
on large, custom, proprietary systems when “light technologies”
© 2011 Thomson Reuters
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or shared services exist. Government officials have been trying
to adopt best practices for years .... But obstacles have always
gotten in the way.

Vivek Kundra, U.S. Chief Information Officer, 25 Point Implementation
Plan to Reform Federal Information Technology Management (December
9, 2010), available at http://cio.gov/documents/25-Point-ImplementationPlan-to-Reform-Federal%20IT.pdf; see also Administration Issues IT Procurement Strategy, 52 GC ¶ 391. This has the makings of an ambitious
reform agenda:
[H]ighlights of the implementation plan include:
•

Turnaround or terminate at least one-third of underperforming
projects in IT portfolio within the next 18 months

•

Shift to “Cloud First” policy….

•

Reduce number of Federal data centers by at least 800 by 2015

•

Only approve funding of major IT programs that:
- Have a dedicated program manager and a fully staffed integrated program team
- Use a modular approach with usable functionality delivered
every six months
- Use specialized IT acquisition professionals

•

Work with Congress to:
- Consolidate commodity IT funding under the Agency CIOs
and
- Develop flexible budget models that align with modular development

•

Launch an interactive platform for pre-RFP agency-industry collaboration

It is encouraging to hear that OMB, in this context, seems to have
embraced some of the lessons learned from the government’s failure to
adequately invest in the acquisition workforce. “Effective IT acquisition
requires a combination of thorough knowledge of the Federal acquisition
system, including the tools available, a deep understanding of the dynamic
commercial IT marketplace, and the unique challenges inherent to successfully delivering large IT programs in a modular time-boxed manner.”
Accordingly, OFPP and the Federal CIO “will design a specialized IT acquisition cadre.” OFPP also will “develop guidance on requirements for IT
acquisition specialists ... [and] develop guidance on curriculum standards
to cross-train program managers and IT acquisition professionals.” Also
watch for contract vehicles for cloud-based Infrastructure-as-a-Service
(Iaas) and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) solutions. Overall, it is an optimistic and far-reaching agenda. Strong promises have been made:
Federal IT projects will no longer last multiple years without
delivering meaningful functionality. Poorly performing projects
will be identified early and put under a spotlight for turnaround
– those that continue to flounder will be terminated. No longer
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will large IT contracts be negotiated by individuals without IT
expertise. No longer will one agency build expensive new data
centers when other agencies have excess capacity. And no longer
will rigid budgeting constraints prevent executives from making
smart decisions with taxpayer dollars; flexible models will allow
agency leaders to shift funds where and when they are needed,
ensuring that results matter more than plans.

Despite this soaring, all-encompassing prose, it remains unclear whether
OMB achieved buy-in from the government’s large and diverse IT community. On the same day that OMB launched its twenty-five-point plan,
DoD released its Section 804 Report, A New Approach for Delivering Information Technology Capabilities in the Department of Defense (November
2010), available at https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Lists/Policy_Documents/
Attachments/3255/OSD13744-10-804ReportToCongress.pdf.
The DoD is developing a comprehensive new process to acquire
and deliver IT capabilities. This process will leverage ongoing
Department efforts to streamline Defense Business Systems
(DBS) acquisition and incorporate best practices garnered from
engagement with industry and lessons learned from ongoing
DoD efforts. The new process is intended to take full advantage
of the speed of IT innovation from commercial industry to foster
an environment for mission-focused and time-critical deliveries
that support the full spectrum of IT applications within the
DoD. Significant and fundamental change … is envisioned to not
only improve the IT acquisition cycle time but also to realize the
advantages inherent within the operations and maintenance
of IT products and services. Requirements, resourcing, and
acquisition management will be synchronized and streamlined
with risk-scaled oversight through frequent in-process reviews
and milestone decision points. IT will be acquired as “timeboxed” projects delivering capability in an iterative fashion
using mature technologies, while managed in capability-aligned
portfolios to identify and eliminate redundancy. The new IT
acquisition process will apply across the DoD information
enterprise, delivering effective IT to our front line warfighters
and enabling more efficient business operations.

Guiding Principles:
•

Deliver Early and Often.

•

Incremental and Iterative Development and Testing.

•

Rationalized Requirements.

•

Flexible/Tailored Processes.

•

Knowledgeable and Experienced IT Workforce.

VII. QUANTIFYING THE TOXIC ENVIRONMENT?
We remain concerned that, all too often, for political purposes, the
public is not exposed to an objective, even-handed assessment of the roles
contractors play and the extent of their contribution to the government’s
© 2011 Thomson Reuters
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myriad missions. In large part, however, much of the worst anti-contractor
rhetoric has been toned down, particularly from the White House. We
credit OFPP Administrator Dan Gordon’s steady leadership and balanced
approach for this positive trend.
Nonetheless, we remain wary that if contractors are unnecessarily
vilified, resources will be shifted from pursuing value-based outcomes
to creating compliance and risk avoidance regimes, which would be an
inefficient over-reaction. The United States enjoys one of the world’s best
public procurement regimes. Government customers enjoy excellent value
for taxpayer money. Contractors provide extraordinary levels of support,
particularly in extreme conditions such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
does not mean there is no room for improvement. But optimizing return
on investment entails a different approach from many of the initiatives
we see, particularly from Congress. As discussed below, we are not alone
in this belief.
A. The Great Divide? Last year, we conceded that a casual observer
could be forgiven for concluding that procurement policy today is being
driven primarily by the inspector general and audit community. Accordingly, we were intrigued by the Professional Services Council Acquisition
Policy Survey, The Great Divide (October 2010), available at http://www.
pscouncil.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Publications/ProcurementPolicySurvey/2010_Acquisition_Policy_Survey.pdf. The survey and report
chronicled the marked difference in the answers of operational acquisition
professionals – the people who actually purchase the goods and services
necessary for the government to perform its missions – and those whose
role is primarily oversight (e.g., legislative staff, GAO, etc.) of the people
and firms that do the work. The survey reveals a widening chasm between
the trajectory of acquisition policy and what government acquisition professionals believe will add value to the mission of the government. Many
of the results offer stark contrasts. For example,
•

Eighty-six percent of all interviewees said that more resources
are going to oversight activities than to contract administration
[and, to be clear, we find that outcome both frustrating and inefficient];

•

The operational community voiced concern that the push for
transparency is
- going too far and
- requiring labor-intensive reporting with no clear value analysis;

•

The acquisition community is still feeling the effects of the arbitrary [personnel] reductions made in the 1990s, but too often,
laws are passed or regulations are issued without regard to
agencies’ ability to implement them and with little concern for
potential unintended consequences;
Two-thirds of all interviewees said the guidance from the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB)—much of it based on legislative mandates—was neither clear nor actionable, and eighty
percent said they did not have the resources to implement the
guidance;

•

9-13

© 2011 Thomson Reuters

NOTES
•

Seventy percent of all interviewees said that OMB’s proposed
guidance on defining inherently governmental functions would
not change the way agencies contracted for services;

•

With regard to the administration’s push to award more fixedprice contracts and less cost-reimbursement (and specifically,
less time-and-materials) contracts
- in 2008: sixty percent speculated that the restrictions would
not improve contracting outcomes
- in 2010: seventy-one percent said that these mandates, indeed, have not resulted in better outcomes (whereas twelve
percent saw at least some benefit);

•

Seventy-two percent of the operational professionals described
the current structure regarding organizational conflicts of interests as effective, while sixty percent of oversight professionals
found it ineffective;

•

Operational professionals graded the capacity of agencies to mitigate conflicts as 4.4 out of 5; oversight professionals rated that
capacity as 1.8 out of 5;

•

More than ninety percent of the operational professionals described the current structure regarding personal conflicts of interests as effective, while eighty percent of oversight professional
found it ineffective;

PSC’s report concluded that, as compliance regimes increase, business
judgment (on the part of government acquisition professionals) is deemphasized. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of the survey respondents
believe this is precisely the wrong direction. Moreover, operational respondents feel that oversight is based on compliance with sometimes irrelevant
rules, when it should be based on whether the right capability or outcome
was delivered through an appropriately awarded and managed contract.
B. Applying Government Personal Conflict of Interest Rules to
Contractor Personnel? In 2010, Congress re-established the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), “an independent federal
agency dedicated to improving the administrative process through consensus-driven applied research, providing nonpartisan expert advice and
recommendations for improvement of federal agency procedures.” http://
www.acus.gov/about/. One of ACUS’ first projects involves “Government
Contractor Ethics.” http://www.acus.gov/research/the-conference-currentprojects/government-contractor-ethics/.
The Conference believes that certain important aspects of the
ethics rules applicable to government employees should be
extended to contractor employees in order to increase public
confidence in the government’s acquisition system. This should
be done in a manner that is cost effective, takes into account the
disparate needs of the various agencies that utilize independent
contractors, and is sensitive to the burdens that extension of
the ethics system to contractor employees would impose on
agencies and the companies and small businesses with which
they contract.
© 2011 Thomson Reuters
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ACUS is considering two options:
Option 1: The Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) Council
should consider drafting a mandatory FAR clause that would
adopt … standards … as a minimum set of ethical rules applicable
to service contractors and contractor employees who do business
with all agencies covered by the FAR system. The FAR clause
should [(a)] require that each contractor implement internal
mechanisms to train employees …, to protect against violations
of the rules, and to mitigate any violations that occur …;
[(b)] provide that the contracting agency may terminate the
contract for material breach of the ethical standards … and
hold the contractor liable for any damages…; [(c) authorize the]
contracting agency … to suspend or bar contractors from further
contracting based on past violations.
Option 2: Each executive agency should identify the ethical
risks that confront its contractors and contractor employees ….
[E]ach agency should then determine whether adopting
ethical rules regulating those risks would be cost-effective
and, if so, what ethical standards the rules should impose on
contractors and contractor employees …. [T]he agency should
consider whether to adopt rules by a rulemaking process or
instead to impose rules on a contract-by-contract basis through
appropriate clauses integrated into individual contracts ….
[E]ach agency should determine the appropriate consequences
for violation of its rules.

http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2010/12/COADraft-Recommendation-POSTED-ON-WEB.pdf. ACUS’ first call for public
comments on this issue generated, basically, no substantive responses
whatsoever. This suggests that the acquisition community is not yet cognizant of this potentially important policy initiative.
C. Organizational Conflicts of Interest. As 2010 was ending, DoD
issued a final rule on organizational conflicts of interest in major defense
acquisition programs, pursuant to the WASRA. See Final Rule, Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Organizational Conflicts
of Interest in Major Defense Acquisition Programs, 75. Fed. Reg. 81908,
available at http://origin.www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-12-29/
pdf/2010-32713.pdf. The prefatory language clarifies that: “because the
FAR proposed rule has not yet been published, and because the decision
has been made to limit this rule to implementation of OCIs in [major
defense acquisition programs (MDAPs)], this final rule has been located
primarily in [DFARS] subpart 209.5, until such time as the FAR coverage
on OCIs may be relocated[.]” Last year, we wondered whether Northrop
Grumman’s sale of TASC, a government consulting division, to comply with
the WSARA’s new organizational conflict of interest (OCI) requirements
was an isolated incident or a harbinger. In retrospect, it did not signal
an opening of a floodgate. It seems unlikely that the new DoD rule, with
the OFPP initiative pending, will dramatically change the short-term
landscape.
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See also Ralph C. Nash, Postscript V: Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 24 N&CR ¶ 39 (“the rule that the GAO has established is that an
agency can award a contract containing an OCI and negotiate a mitigation plan at its leisure. This flies in the face of sound policy that should
require an acceptable mitigation plan before award of the contract—or at
least in a very timely manner following a protest ruling that the plan in
unacceptable. Otherwise, the Government can be faced with a long period
of performance in the face of an OCI[.]”(emphasis added)); Postscript IV:
Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 24 N&CR ¶ 25.
D. An Update: Transparency Into Contractor Fatalities and Injuries. We previously have expressed frustration that contractor fatalities
(and injuries) remained generally outside the public’s consciousness. This
seems particularly significant now that, as of the summer of 2010, more
than 2,000 contractors have died in Iraq and Afghanistan. Among other
things, we believe that, in a representative democracy, public awareness
of the human cost of our nation’s security and foreign policies is critical. A
significant body of research suggests that the public is at least somewhat
sensitive to military casualties, and we continue to wonder what impacts,
if any, derive from a significant substitution of contractor fatalities.
We have applauded the government’s efforts, particularly at GAO, to
do a better job of both keeping track of and reporting these losses. Not
long ago, the only way to obtain any of this data was through a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, Why
Contractor Fatalities Matter, 38 Parameters 78 (Autumn 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1303022. Last year, we commended the Labor Department for a giant step towards transparency for posting on the
Internet the data it generates based upon claims filed under the Defense
Base Act and the War Hazards Compensation Act, which make contractor employees eligible for worker’s compensation benefits pursuant to the
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. See generally www.
dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsdbareports.htm. Alas, the trend line was extremely
disturbing. The publicly available data showed steady annual increases in
contractor deaths as military deaths declined. Specifically, the data showed
a dramatic increase starting in Iraq in 2007, and in Afghanistan in 2009.
Of particular concern was that, according to the Labor Department data,
contractor deaths in Iraq in 2009 and 2010 actually surpassed military
deaths; similarly, the data indicates that in the first half of 2010, more
contractors died in Afghanistan than U.S. soldiers. See, e.g., Steven L.
Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Contractors and the Ultimate Sacrifice, Service
Contractor (September 2010), available at http://www.pscouncil.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/Publications/ServiceContractorMagazine/
SC_SEPT2010_Web.pdf.
We now understand that, based upon GAO’s recent work, we need to
revisit this data. As we expected, the contractor fatality figures may be
significantly higher than the data previously suggested. See generally
GAO-11-1, Iraq & Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued
Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated
Personnel (October 2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-11-1; Overseas Contract Tracking Still Faces Challenges, GAO Finds,
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52 GC ¶ 333 (“SPOT [the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational
Tracker] ‘still cannot reliably track information on contracts, assistance
instruments, and associated personnel,’ GAO said.”). The Labor Department “explained that injuries to local and third country contractors, in
particular, may be underreported.” In addition, GAO acknowledged that
it “could not verify whether State’s and USAID’s data were complete …
[and] a recent report from the USAID Inspector General suggested that not
all security contractors in Afghanistan are reporting incidents that result
in personnel being injured or killed.” DoD continues to lack “a reliable
system for tracking killed or wounded contractor personnel[,]” but DoD
“eventually intend[s] to track the number of killed and wounded contractor personnel through SPOT.” Moreover: “A DOD official in Afghanistan
knowledgeable on the matter cautioned though that the reports most
likely understate the actual number of contractor casualties, as not all
contractors submit reports as required.” Finally, it may be impossible for
the public to chronicle these fatalities with temporal accuracy because
“Labor’s Web site provides data on DBA cases by the date that each case
was created, which is not always the date that the incident occurred.”
VIII. A LONG, LONG TIME AGO.
It seems fitting to conclude this discussion of emerging issues with at
least a passing reference to the A-12 litigation. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
& General Dynamics Corp. v. United States. The U.S Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit described this litigation as the American version of
Jarndyce and Jarndyce, the fictional court case in the Charles Dickens
novel Bleak House. (“This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become
so complicated that no man alive knows what it means.”) The Supreme
Court granted certiorari (in McDonnell Douglas, not Jaryndyce) for the
purpose of reviewing to what extent the government’s invocation of the
state secrets privilege may have impacted the outcome of this long-running
litigation. Now, “final resolution … may well turn on the complicated and
little explored interplay between the Government’s right to protect highly
sensitive information [in] dispute resolution on contracts involving that
information.” Neil H. O’Donnell and Dennis J. Callahan, Feature Comment: The A-12 Saga Continues, 52 GC ¶ 388. Experience suggests that
the Supreme Court will not involve itself with the nuances of a government contract dispute, but nothing is certain. More dramatically, however,
this stage of appellate review guarantees that this long-running dispute
will survive into its twentieth year. Ask yourself: Where were you in the
winter of 1990/1991, when the Navy terminated the contract? How about
in June of 1991, when the contractors filed their lawsuit in the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims? It is hard not to be cynical about an acquisition regime
and a judicial system that keeps this story unfolding.
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